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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No. 06-3256
                              
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
AARON TAYLOR,
          Appellant
                                  
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 02-cr-00066)
District Judge:   Hon. R. Barclay Surrick
                                  
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 9, 2007
Before:   SCIRCA, Chief Judge, AMBRO and JORDAN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: November 30, 2007)
                                
OPINION OF THE COURT
                                 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
    1  We have jurisdiction over Taylor’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
Defendant Aaron Taylor (“Taylor”) appeals from a judgment of conviction and
sentence for possession with the intent to distribute cocaine base and possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon.  We will affirm.1
I. BACKGROUND
On August 12, 2002, a jury convicted Taylor of the aforementioned offenses.
Under the then-mandatory sentencing guidelines, the District Court imposed a sentence of
360 months imprisonment, a term of supervised release of ten years, and a special
assessment of $200.  We later vacated the sentence and remanded for re-sentencing in
light of the advisory nature of the guidelines following United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220 (2005).  At his second sentencing hearing, Taylor requested a downward departure
from the guidelines based on his age and various health problems.  The District Court
again imposed the same sentence. 
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Taylor argues that the District Court mistakenly believed that it lacked
discretion to grant a downward departure based on his poor health, and that the case must
therefore be again remanded for re-sentencing.  Taylor relies entirely on a single
statement from the District Court at his second sentencing hearing.  Responding to
Taylor’s contention that his poor health justified a downward departure, the District Judge
said:
    2  Even if the District Court’s comments on the challenges posed by aging and ill
prisoners are taken to mean that the District Court was expressing an opinion about
whether, as a policy matter, ill health ought to justify a downward departure, the Court
recognized that it had the discretion to depart downwards based on Taylor’s poor health.
Immediately after commenting on the problems posed by aging and ill prisoners, the
Judge said that “in any event, I do not believe that [Taylor’s] health is a reason to adjust
the sentence in this situation.”  (JA at 76.)
3
The fact that Mr. Taylor is in ill health, evidentially suffers from hepatitis C,
is really not a reason to reduce his sentence.  If ill health were a reason, we
would be inundated with applications from prisoners to, seeking their release.
There’s just–one of the biggest problems our society faces is the fact of an
aging population that’s incarcerated.  But in any event, I do not believe that his
health is a reason for me to adjust his sentence in this situation.
(Joint Appendix [“JA”] at 76.)
We do not believe that this remark can bear the weight Taylor places on it.  His
attorney specifically advised the District Court that a downward departure for Taylor’s
poor health was available, and the District Court stated that the guidelines were advisory
rather than mandatory after Booker.  Contrary to Taylor’s assertion, the District Court
never stated that it lacked the discretion to consider Taylor’s health.  Instead, the Court
stated that Taylor’s poor health was “not a reason to reduce his sentence.”  (JA at 76.)
Considered in context, we believe that the District Court expressed the view that Taylor’s
illness did not warrant a downward departure because Taylor had not shown that his
illness was any more severe than the illnesses generally experienced by older prisoners
like himself.2  
Taylor  also argues that a comparison of the District Court’s discussion of his
request for a downward departure based on ill health with the District Court’s discussion
    3  In response to Taylor’s request for a downward departure based on age, the District
Court said that “[t]he most telling thing is that when Mr. Taylor was released from jail, he
went right back to crime every time.  And there’s no reason why, this Court should
anticipate, even his late 60's that Mr. Taylor is going to become a law abiding citizen.” 
(JA at 76.)
4
of his request for a downward departure based on advanced age demonstrates that the
District Court mistakenly believed it could grant a downward departure based on his age
but not on his health.  According to Taylor, unlike its “categorical rejection of ill health as
a sentencing consideration, the [District Court] addressed [the request for a downward
departure based on age] on its merits.”3  (Reply Br. at 6.)  We disagree that the District
Court categorically rejected ill health as a sentencing consideration, and thus find
Taylor’s argument unpersuasive.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment and commitment order.
